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I. Introduction
In 1972 Pennsylvania adopted the curative amendment proce-
dure,' a welcome addition to existing regulations on planning and
* B.A., 1963; J.D., 1966, University of Pittsburgh; Member of the Allegheny
County and Pennsylvania Bar; Partner, Rosenzweig & Rosenzweig. Mr. Rosenzweig
specializes in land use, planning, and zoning law.
1. Act of June 1, 1972, P.L. 333, No. 93 (effective in 60 days). The pertinent
sections are §§ 609.1, 1004, 1011. These sections may be found at PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, §§ 10609.1, 11004, 11011 (1972).
zoning. This procedure, aimed at reconciling the constitutional rights
of landowners with the reasonable exercise of municipal land use
control, provides a new vehicle for landowners to assert substantive
challenges to the validity of zoning ordinances in one proceeding and
to obtain definitive relief within a reasonable time.
Typically, an attack on an ordinance starts with a request to the
governing body2 for an amendment of the zoning ordinance and
involves an extensive evidentiary hearing.3 In the past it was difficult
to appeal a denied application for an amendment directly to the
courts. Recourse to the zoning hearing board normally was necessary,
which meant the landowner had to repeat the same presentation
before the zoning hearing board in order to reach the courts, an
expensive and time-consuming process. In addition to these cumber-
some procedures, the criteria associated with the exercise of legislative
power by the governing body or administrative discretion by a zoning
officer or the zoning hearing board resulted in tunnel vision. Review-
ing courts, capable of seeing broader issues, were constrained by a
record containing matters traditionally or legally limited to the partic-
ular body or officer from which the appeal was taken. Such a com-
partmentalized approach4 to zoning and land use planning is ill suited
to zoning ordinance challenges brought in the context of professional-
ly prepared comprehensive plans, community development objectives,
and new methods of planning and development.
The curative amendment procedure was intended to correct this
defect by providing a speedy review of zoning ordinance challenges.
The legal parameters for the procedure are the traditional require-
ments that zoning ordinances must bear a substantial relation to
police power purposes of promoting the health, safety, morals, and
2. The governing body is defined as
the council in cities, boroughs and incorporated towns; the board of com-
missioners in townships of the first class; the board of supervisors in town-
ships of the second class; the board of commissioners in counties of the sec-
ond class A through eighth classes or as may be designated in the law pro-
viding for the form of government.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10107(10) (1972).
3. Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litigation and the New Pennsylvania Procedures, 120
U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1097 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Krasnowiecki].
4. In the 1920's the Department of Commerce under the direction of Secretary
Herbert Hoover prepared two models that established the broad outlines of statutory
land planning in the United States. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act was a
model for states to authorize their subdivisions to divide territory into districts with
uniform regulations throughout the district but with different regulations for each
district. The Standard City Planning Enabling Act, prepared in 1928 after twenty-
nine states had adopted the state model, was a model for cities to use in establishing a
planning agency and a master plan. The acts may be found at ALI MODEL LAND
DEVELOPMENT CODE 210, 222 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968). Most states including
Pennsylvania have developed a compartmentalized approach to zoning with a cumber-
some distribution of powers and functions among the governing body, zoning board,
planning commission, and sundry other officers and agencies because they utilized
these acts as models. Krasnowiecki, supra'note 3, at 1032.
Curative Amendment Procedure
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
general welfare of the community, cannot be confiscatory, and cannot
be exclusionary by totally prohibiting a legitimate and accepted use
without reason.
Recently the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania decided
several cases construing the statutory sections that establish the cura-
tive amendment procedure. 5 By examining these decisions, this article
will seek to answer basic questions about the curative amendment
procedure: what it is, when to use it, and how to prove the case.
II. The Curative Amendment Procedure
Section 1004 of the Municipalities Planning Code (MPC)8
governs all challenges to the substantive validity of a zoning ordi-
nance in which the landowner seeks a use not permitted in the zoning
district. 7 Nonpermitted uses include both use types and use intensities.
Examples of the former are commercial or multiple family uses in a
single family residential district. Examples of the latter are smaller
minimum lot requirements for single family developments in a single
family residence district or more units per acre for multiple family
development in a multiple family district. Such challenges are consti-
tutional in nature and can be decided adversely to the municipality
only by a court.8 Section 1004 of the MPC provides alternate means
5. Kaufman & Broad, Inc. v. West Whiteland Tp., - Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
-, 340 A.2d 909 (1975); Pyle v. Harmar Tp. Zoning Hearing Bd., - Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. -, 340 A.2d 613 (1975); Penn Tp. Bd. of Sup'rs v. DeRose, - Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. -, 339 A.2d 859 (1975); Gorski v. Township of Skippack, -
Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 339 A.2d 624 (1975); Phelan v. Zoning Hearing Bd., -
Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 339 A.2d 612 (1975); Kratz v. Skippack Tp., - Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. -, 339 A.2d 595 (1975); Shuttle Dev. Corp. v. Township of
Upper Dublin, - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 338 A.2d 777 (1975); Appeal of Olson,
- Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 338 A.2d 748 (1975); Ellick v. Board of Sup'rs, 17 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975); Warren v. Ferrick, 17 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 421, 333 A.2d 237 (1975); Robin Corp. v. Board of Sup'rs, 17 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 386, 332 A.2d 841 (1975); Board of Comm'rs v. Beho Dev. Co.,
16 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 448, 332 A.2d 848 (1975); Hess v. Upper Oxford Tp.,
17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 399, 332 A.2d 836 (1975).
The only authority prior to 1975 opinions was Township of Neville v. Exxon
Corp., 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 225, 322 A.2d 144 (1974), and Krasnowiecki,
supra note 3.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-11202 (1972) [hereinafter cited as MPC].
The MPC delegates zoning and planning functions to every level of municipal
government. It is not applicable to cities of the first and second classes (Philadelphia
and Pittsburgh, respectively), id. § 10107(5), or to counties of the first and second
classes (Philadelphia County and Allegheny County, respectively), id. § 10107(6).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004 (1972).
8. Id. § 11004(3). If the municipality fails to adopt a curative amendment, the
validity of the ordinance is determined by a court.
for initiating such challenges.9 An application may be made to the
zoning hearing board under section 910 of the MPC.10 The zoning
hearing board makes findings on all relevant issues of fact, which
then become part of a record on appeal to the court. Alternatively, the
landowner can apply to the governing body by proposing a curative
amendment that would permit the prohibited use under section 609.1
of the MPC. The governing body can accept the curative amend-
ment and thereby resolve the substantive validity challenge. If the
governing body refuses to accept it, a court will determine the consti-
tutional question and may grant the landowner the requested use. The
landowner may choose the procedure most appropriate to his particu-
lar situation. In fact, the landowner may begin with the curative
amendment procedure and later switch to the zoning board proce-
dure. If the curative amendment is denied and the landowner decides
not to appeal, he may present to the zoning hearing board the same
validity question that he presented to the governing body.'"
Section 609.1 of the MPC outlines the curative amendment
procedure, integrating it into the MPC by way of cross reference to
other sections.13 Section 1004 governs the hearing procedure;" sec-
tion 609, the role of the planning agency;' 5 sections 610 and 1004,
the types of notices;' 6 and section 908, the conduct of the hearing.' 7
The requirements for application to the zoning hearing board and to
the governing body are the same. The landowner must make a written
request for a hearing containing a statement reasonably informing the
board or the governing body of the matter at issue and the grounds
for the challenge.' 8 This request may be submitted at any time after
the ordinance takes effect, but in the event that an application for a
permit has been made and denied, the request must be made within
thirty days after the denial.' Plans and other materials describing the
use or development proposed by the landowner in lieu of the use or
development permitted by the challenged ordinance or map must
accompany the request.20 These plans need not be as detailed as those
required for the issuance of permits, as long as they provide reasona-
ble notice of the proposed use or development and a sufficient basis
9. Id. § 11004(1); Penn Tp. Bd. of Sup'rs v. DeRose, - Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. -, -, 339 A.2d 859, 860 (1975).
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10910 (1972).
11. Id. § 10609.1.
12. Id. § 11004(3).
13. Id. § 10609.1.
14. Id. § 11004.
15. Id. § 10609.
16. Id. H8 10610, 11004.
17. Id. § 10908.
18. Id. § 11004(2)(a).
19. Id. § 11004(2)(b).
20. Id. § 11004(2)(c).
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for evaluating the challenged ordinance or map in light thereof. If he
is proceeding under the curative amendment procedure, the landown-
er must submit a proposed amendment to the ordinance to cure the
alleged defect.2 This is the only difference between a substantive
challenge to the governing body and one to the zoning hearing board.
In a challenge to the zoning hearing board no amendment need be
submitted.
For a curative amendment the notice must follow sections
609.122 and 610.23 The curative amendment should be referred to the
planning agency at least thirty days prior to a hearing on the proposed
amendment to provide the planning agency an opportunity to submit
a recommendation. 24 The content of the public notice must include
either the full text of the proposed zoning ordinance and amendments
or a reasonably detailed summary of the principal provisions, plus a
reference to the place within the municipality where copies of the
proposed ordinance or amendment may be examined and the time
and place of the hearing.25 Public notice must be published once each
week for two successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the municipality, stating the time and place of the hearing and the
particular nature of the matter to be considered at the hearing. The
first publication must be not more than thirty days or less than
fourteen days from the date of the hearing.26 Under the terms of
section 1004(2)(e) the public notice also must state that the validity
of the ordinance or map is in question and must give the place where
and the time when a copy of the landowner's request, including the
plan submitted and the proposed amendment, may be examined by
the public.27 These sections must be read together so that the amend-
ment is referred to the planning commission thirty days before the
public hearing and proper advertisements are placed in a newspaper
at the appropriate time.
The emphasis is on timeliness in the validity challenge proce-
dure. A hearing on the landowner's challenge, whether the challenge
is made before the zoning hearing board or the governing body, must
21. Id. § 11004(2)(d).
22. Id. § 10609.1.
23. Id. § 10610.
24. Id. § 10609.
25. Id. § 10610.
26. Id. § 10107(18).
27. Id. § 11004(2)(e).
commence not later than sixty days after the request for a hearing is
filed.28 Under section 1004(3)29 the landowner has thirty days after
the denial of his request by the zoning board or the governing body to
appeal to the common pleas court. He also may present the same
validity questions to the zoning hearing board after a denial by the
governing body. 0 Section 1004(4) safeguards a landowner from
common delaying tactics by providing that a curative amendment is
denied when the governing body notifies the landowner that it will
not adopt the amendment or adopts another amendment unacceptable
to the landowner or fails to act, in which event the denial is deemed to
have occurred on the thirtieth day after the close of the last hearing."
The hearing before the governing body on a request for a
curative amendment must be conducted in accordance with subsec-
tions (4) to (8) of section 908.82 The presiding officer has the power
to administer oaths and issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of
witnesses and the production of relevant documents 8 The parties
have the right to be represented by counsel, to present evidence, and
to cross-examine adverse witnesses.3 4 A stenographic record of the
proceedings must be kept. 5 Moreover, all of the parties are protected
from ex parte communications and proceedings by the requirement
that notice of all communications and proceedings and an opportuni-
ty to be present must be given to all parties. 86
A careful analysis of these sections must be made to prepare the
proper application, make the proper advertising, conduct a hearing,
and file an appeal. Failure by a landowner to follow the procedural
requirements of the curative amendment is grounds for dismissal of
his appeal to the court. In Board of Commissioners v. Beho Develop-
ment Co.3 7 the commonwealth court held that the appeal to the lower
court should have been dismissed. The landowner had failed to notify
the commissioners that he was challenging the validity of the ordi-
nance, had submitted a request for rezoning rather than a curative
amendment, and had not attached proposed plans to his request for a
hearing. Having failed to satisfy these procedural requirements, the
landowner's action was held nothing more than a rezoning request.38
28. Id. § 11004(2)(f).
29. Id. § 11004(3).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 11004(4).
32. Id. § 10908(4)-(8).
33. Id. § 10908(4).
34. Id. § 10908(5).
35. Id. § 10908(7).
36. Id. § 10908(8).
37. 16 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 448, 332 A.2d 848 (1975).
38. Id. at-, 332 A.2d at 851.
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III. When To Use the Curative Amendment Procedure
A. When the Curative Amendment Procedure Is Not Appropriate
Recent decisions of the commonwealth court 9 indicate when use
of the curative amendment procedure is inappropriate. According to
these decisions, the curative amendment procedure cannot be used to
obtain an appeal from the denial of a rezoning request that does not
challenge the validity of the zoning ordinance or to replace the
variance procedure or to have a court compel the adoption of a
zoning ordinance amendment.
1. As an Appeal of Denial of Ordinary Rezoning Application.-
In Warren v. Ferrick4° a landowner applied for rezoning prior to the
enactment of the 1972 amendments to the MPC. His application
was denied by the township supervisors and a subsequent appeal to
the common pleas court was dismissed. The commonwealth court
affirmed the dismissal, "but for the reason that the court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the Appeal."'" The court recognized that
the new curative amendment procedure allows a landowner to
submit a substantive challenge to the validity of a zoning ordinance to
the governing body with a right to appeal to the local court of
common pleas, but upheld established law that a municipal governing
body's refusal to rezone is not subject to judicial review.42 Since the
landowner's application predated the curative amendment procedure,
his request could be nothing more than an unappealable request for
rezoning.
A second case demonstrating that the curative amendment pro-
cedure does not provide an appeal from a denied rezoning request is
Board of Commissioners v. Beho Development Co.4" In that case a
landowner sent a letter to the township board of commissioners
requesting a zoning change. The board refused to rezone the proper-
39. See note 5 supra.
40. 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 421, 333 A.2d 237 (1975).
41. Id. at 424, 333 A.2d at 239.
42. Id. at 423, 333 A.2d at 238. In Pennsylvania it is settled that courts will not
interfere with a zoning classification established by a municipality's governing body
unless the classification has no substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or
welfare. Clover Hill Farms, Inc. v. Lehigh Tp. Bd. of Sup'rs, 5 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 239, 289 A.2d 778 (1972); Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Kane, 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
275, 285 A.2d 917 (1972). The refusal of a legislative body to exercise its power to
rezone is not subject to judicial review. Clover Hill Farms, Inc. v. Lehigh Tp. Bd. of
Sup'rs, supra at 243, 289 A.2d at 780. See Cleaver v. Board of Adjust., 414 Pa. 367,
200 A.2d 408 (1964).
43. 16 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 448, 332 A.2d 848 (1975).
ty, but was later ordered to do so by the common pleas court. The
lower court found that a letter requesting the zoning change satisfied
the procedural requirements of a curative amendment challenge to the
validity of the zoning ordinance under section 1004 of the MPC. In
reversing the lower court, the commonwealth court emphasized the
necessity for strict compliance with all procedural requirements found
in sections 1004 and 609.1 and distinguished a request for rezoning
from a request for a curative amendment.
A request for rezoning calls upon a local governing body, acting
in its legislative role, to consider whether or not rezoning is in
the best interest of the community. A "challenge" pursuant to
section 1004(1) (b), 53 P.S. § 11004(1) (b), on the other hand,
requires -the governing body to act, in effect, as a quasi-judicial
body and consider the legal merits of the challenge to the validity
of the ordinance.
44
The court also stated that while a court may grant affirmative relief in
the event of a successful challenge pursuant to section 1004, "there is
no right to appeal from a denial of a request for rezoning." 45
2. As an Alternative to the Variance Procedure.-Prior to the
MPC, substantive validity challenges seeking uses not permitted in a
zoning district were handled procedurally by application to the zoning
hearing board for a variance. This type of variance was termed a use
or validity variance.4 6 A substantial part of the case law now applica-
ble to article X challenges seeking a prohibited use arose in the
context of pre-MPC variance applications. The MPC, however, rede-
fined the variance procedure and greatly limited its applicability.
Section 1001 states that article X shall constitute the exclusive mode
for securing review of any zoning ordinance.47 Logically it would
appear that the variance method of attack on an ordinance has been
replaced and that the redefined variance procedure, which is set forth
in section 912 of the MPC, is simply a way to relax strict application
of zoning requirements to a particular piece of land.48 Unfortunately
Pennsylvania appellate courts have not adopted this view.
In Robin Corp. v. Board of Supervisors49 the commonwealth
court addressed the problem of what effect section 1001 has on pre-
existing zoning practice, i.e. challenging the validity of zoning restric-
tions by variance requests to zoning hearing boards. It concluded that
the traditional variance method of challenging zoning restrictions is
still viable and has not been changed by the 1972 amendments to the
44. Id. at 452, 332 A.2d at 851.
45. Id.
46. R. RYAN, PENNSYLVANIA ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 6.1.7, 6.1.10 (1970).
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11001 (1972).
48. R. RYAN, PENNSYLVANIA ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.1.1 (1970).
49. 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 386, 332 A.2d 841 (1975).
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MPC.50 It also decided that section 1004 substantive challenges and
section 912 requests for variances are mutually exclusive rather than
alternate remedies. 5'
To the extent the commonwealth court maintains that section
912 of the MPC is a vehicle for substantive constitutional challenges
to zoning ordinances,52 it is in error. Furthermore, this erroneous
view of the relationship between sections 912 and 1004 threatens the
viability of the well-conceived statutory scheme contained in articles
IX and X. Statutorily, section 912 is unrelated to section 1004. The
use or validity variance application, procedurally and substantively,
has been replaced by sections 609.1, 910, and 1004. Prior to the
enactment of the MPC's article X, no specific procedures existed for
challenging the substantive validity of zoning ordinances. These chal-
lenges, therefore, were brought under the variance procedure and the
case law that emerged is applicable today to section 1004 substantive
challenges.
In Robin Judge Kramer asserts that "what is essentially a vari-
ance claim" must go to the zoning hearing board since a request for a
variance is "required whenever a landowner desires to challenge the
zoning of his particular tract through a claim which, if established on
the record, would warrant the granting of a variance."53 The land-
owner in Robin challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance as
confiscatory as applied to his property. The court reached the merits
of the challenge by affirming the findings of the township supervi-
sors: Robin's property could be used for some of the purposes permit-
ted by R-1 zoning and Robin had failed to prove that the existing R-1
classification had no substantial relation to public welfare. The com-
monwealth court failed to reach the merits in Beho,54 however,
disposing of the case on the basis that Beho had failed to file a proper
curative amendment application. The court went on to state that
confiscation challenges such as those in Beho and Robin, which allege
deprivation of all reasonable use and request a use not permitted in
the zoning district, should be made by application to the zoning
50. Id. at 394, 332 A.2d at 846; see Ellick v. Board of Sup'rs, 17 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 404, 410, 333 A.2d 239, 244 (1975).
51. 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 396, 332 A.2d at 847.
52. See notes 53-57 and accompanying text infra.
53. 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 396, 332 A.2d at 847.
54. 16 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 448, 332 A.2d 848 (1975). See notes 43-45 and
accompanying text supra for a discussion of Beho.
hearing boardfor a variance under section 912.51 The commonwealth
court followed this pronouncement in declining to consider the merits
of a substantive challenge in Shuttle Development Corp. v. Township
of Upper Dublin; 6 the court of common pleas of Allegheny County
has done likewise in Perlstein v. Monroeville.5
The court's reasoning and conclusions are erroneous. It fails to
consider a number of crucial factors. The MPC was intended to
simplify and unify zoning ordinance challenges, rather than to com-
plicate and bifurcate them further.58 Prior to the enactment of the
MPC the only vehicle for a substantive challenge alleging confiscation
was the variance procedure. This procedure, codified in section 912
of the MPC, is not intended or suited for a substantive challenge
seeking a use not permitted in the zoning district. On the contrary, its
purpose is to vary the strict application of zoning regulations to allow
permitted uses to conform to unique physical circumstances or condi-
tions of a particular property.5 9 Thus section 912 challenges are not
true validity challenges at all. The court has fallen into the trap of
assuming that the old use or validity variance must be continued
under section 912, notwithstanding the enactment of sections 1004
and 910, which are specifically designed for validity challenges seek-
ing a use not permitted in the district. A confiscation claim is a
constitutional claim: it alleges a deprivation of property. The land-
owner is deprived of the reasonable use of his land and seeks to
develop a use different from the uses permitted. He challenges the
zoning as an unlawful restriction on the use of his land. This is a
challenge to the validity of the zoning ordinance. Section 1001 man-
dates that all challenges to the validity of a zoning ordinance proceed
under article X procedures. 60 But by its decisions the commonwealth
court has chosen to relegate confiscation challenges to the variance
procedure.6' Thus a shadow has been cast on an enlightened statutory
scheme for processing substantive challenges seeking uses other than
those permitted in the zoning district. The results are already evident.
The February 1975 cases force zoning ordinance challengers seeking
a use not permitted in the zoning district to use the variance proce-
dure of section 912 instead of section 1004, which is designed
specifically for these challenges. Challengers face the dilemma of (a)
seeking a curative amendment for a use not permitted in the district,
proving confiscation of the property, and having the court dismiss the
55. Id. at 453, 332 A.2d at 852.
56. - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 338 A.2d 777 (1975).
57. No. SA 305 (C.P. Allegheny, July 10, 1975).
58. Krasnowiecki, supra note 3, at 1035.
59. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11001 (1972).
61. See notes 49-57 and accompanying text supra.
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case because the proof resembles that used in pre-MPC validity
variance cases, or (b) pursuing a variance challenge under section
912, proving confiscation of the property, and having the case dis-
missed for not meeting section 912 criteria that are designed to vary
regulations to accommodate a permitted use. All proof of the appro-
priateness of the proposed use in lieu of the use or development
permitted by the challenged ordinance or map is excluded in variance
proceedings. 62 Moreover, the challenger may have to seek a variance
under section 912 and be denied on inapplicable variance criteria
before qualifying for the curative amendment procedure.
For these reasons it should be clear that the statutory scheme has
been erroneously ignored. A curative amendment challenge of total
prohibition of a legitimate use or of general confiscation within the
zoning district cannot be combined with a challenge that zoning
restrictions as applied to a particular property deprive the owner of all
reasonable use, even if the challenges are related.
3. As a Method To Compel Adoption of a Zoning Ordinance
Amendment.-A request for curative amendment that is more than
a request for rezoning, that challenges the validity of the zoning ordi-
nance, and that is not essentially a variance claim based upon unique
physical conditions or circumstances still cannot be used to have a
court compel the adoption of an amendment to a zoning ordinance.
Yet, it can provide definitive relief to a successful challenger.
The enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances is a purely
legislative function which the courts have no power to review.
A court may, of course, grant affirmative relief in the event of
a successful challenge pursuant to section 1004 of the MPC, 53
P.S. § 11004, by ordering that the challenger's proposed plans
be approved, but a court may not order property rezoned or a
curative amendment adopted.
63
According to Ellick v. Board of Supervisors,64 the curative
amendment submitted by the landowner is an offer to the governing
body.
As we read the 1972 amendments, the Legislature intended the
proposed curative amendment to be merely an offer or sugges-
tion to the governing body which will aid it in any attempt it
may desire to make to cure a defective ordinance. 65
62. See Robin Corp. v. Board of Sup'rs, 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 386, 396-
97, 332 A.2d 841, 847 (1975).
63. Board of Comm'rs v. Beho Dev. Co., 16 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 448, 454-
55, 332 A.2d 848, 852 (1975).
64. 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975).
65. Id. at 415, 333 A.2d at 246.
If the governing body determines that its ordinance is valid, denies
the challenge, and refuses to adopt any amendment that would permit
the landowner's proposed use or development, the landowner may
appeal to the local court of common pleas. In reviewing the determi-
nation of the governing body, "[i]t is the duty of the courts of
common pleas to decide purely legal questions of whether the chal-
lenged zoning ordinance is legal or constitutional ... ."66 If the
court finds the ordinance invalid, then it must grant definitive relief to
the property owner.
Section 1011 of the MPC 67 outlines the relief a court is author-
ized to give. Ellick6 s construed these powers to mean that the court
may order the described development or use to be approved in whole
or in part, subject to those zoning regulations in the defective ordi-
nance that are valid and reasonably adaptable to the successful chal-
lenger's plan. 69 If the court finds none of the restrictions of the
ordinance reasonable, it may refer the approved development or use
to the governing body for processing in accordance with the court's
opinion. This processing may include the adoption of restrictions
alternative to those in the challenged ordinance to accommodate the
approved development. The court, however, may not control or order
the manner in which or the extent to which the ordinance is to be
amended, although it may remand the ordinance to the governing
body for formulation of reasonable restrictions and review the re-
sults.
70
B. When the Curative Amendment Procedure Is Appropriate
Some general guidelines regarding the appropriateness of the
curative amendment procedure to particular sets of circumstances
have emerged from recent court decisions. The most fundamental is
66. Id.
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011 (1972). The pertinent part reads as
follows:
[I]t may order the described development or use approved as to all ele-
ments or it may order it approved as to some elements and refer other ele-
ments to the governing body, agency or officer having jurisdiction thereof
for further proceedings, including the adoption of alternative restrictions, in
accordance with the court's opinion and order.
Id. § 11011(2).
68. 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 404, 415-17, 333 A.2d 239, 246-47 (1975).
69. Elaborating on this the court said,
For example, if a court determines that an ordinance is defective because
of the total prohibition of townhouses, then it would be proper to approve
the plan of the landowner subject to all of the other zoning regulations and
provisions of the ordinance applicable to residential usage insofar as they
are reasonably adaptable to townhouses.
Id. at 417, 333 A.2d at 247; accord, Appeal of Olson, - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -,
-, 338 A.2d 748, 751 (1975).




that the procedure is not limited to facial attacks on the constitution-
ality of a zoning ordinance, but is the appropriate means of testing
the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance as applied to specific prop-
erty.71
Two situations in which use of the curative amendment proce-
dure may be especially appropriate are (1) when confiscation results
from the application of a zoning ordinance that provides uses that
cannot be developed on the land as distinguished from the inability
to adapt a permitted use to a site suffering unique physical circum-
stances, particularly when all statutory variance criteria cannot be
met, and (2) when a zoning ordinance fails to bear a substantial
relation to the police powers of a municipality.
1. The Confiscation Challenge.-A confiscation challenge es-
sentially alleges that a zoning ordinance denies the owner every
reasonable use of his land.72 Prior to the MPC, to make a confiscation
claim seeking a prohibited use, a landowner had to apply for a use or
validity variance and, if denied, appeal to the common pleas court; or
he could request rezoning. When the confiscation resulted from
unique physical characteristics of the land that made a conforming
use impossible, a variance was granted. 73 Frequently, however, courts
were forced to ignore some of the variance criteria in order to grant
relief to a deserving landowner. Many courts granted variances based
on confiscation claims even though the property involved was not
unique. 74 A directive of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
71. Robin Corp. v. Board of Sup'rs, 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 386, 393 n.4,
332 A.2d 842, 845 n.4 (1975); Township of Neville v. Exxon Corp., 14 Pa. Com-
monwealth Ct. 225, 231 n.4, 322 A.2d 144, 147 n.4; Krasnowiecki, supra note 3, at
1102.
72. Marple Tp. Appeal, 430 Pa. 113, 243 A.2d 357 (1968). The substantive
principles governing the confiscation challenge are stated in Garbev Zoning Case, 385
Pa. 328, 122 A.2d 682 (1956).
73. E.g., Forest Hills Borough Appeal, 409 Pa. 392, 187 A.2d 166 (1963) (gas
station permitted in single family residential district); Poster Adv. Co. v. Zoning Bd.
of Adjust., 408 Pa. 248, 182 A.2d 521 (1962) (outdoor advertising sign permitted in
residential district); Ferry v. Kownacki, 396 Pa. 283, 152 A.2d 456 (1959) (gas
station permitted in single family residential district); Higgins v. Township of
Radnor, 13 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 195, 318 A.2d 761 (1974) (tennis club permitted
in residential district); Zoning Bd. of Adjust. v. Koehler, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
260, 278 A.2d 375 (1971) (gas station permitted in light manufacturing district).
The variance request in § 912 is a confiscation claim based upon the landowner's
inability to adapt a site suffering unique physical circumstances to a permitted use.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10912 (1972).
74. See Peirce v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust., 410 Pa. 262, 189 A.2d 138 (1963) (gas
station permitted in residential district even though other residential property was
subject to the same hardship); Nicholson v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust., 392 Pa. 278, 140
McClure Appeal75 aptly'characterizes the dilemma:
As a general rule, if the land, as a practical matter, cannot be
utilized for residential purposes, then the land should be rezoned
by an appeal to the legislative body. Such rezoning cannot and
must not be accomplished under the guise of a variance.7
6
Fortunately, situations that do not meet the variance requirements but
do involve confiscation now fall within the curative amendment pro-
cedure. Two common situations are discussed below.
(a) Purchaser with knowledge.-Section 912(3) of the MPC pre-
vents the granting of a variance when the zoning hearing board
finds that the applicant has created the "unnecessary hardship.
'77
Traditionally, if a landowner knew at the time he purchased property
that it was subject to zoning restrictions, his claim for a variance
would be denied. In effect, he created his own hardship by purchas-
ing property knowing of the restriction. This purchaser-with-knowl-
edge principle has been ignored by some courts, 78 employed by others
to deny a variance even when confiscation was proven,79 and used by
still others as a makeweight in denying a variance when no confisca-
tion was proven.80 The only situation in which Pennsylvania courts
will apply it at all is when "property has been sold to a new owner
who has paid a high price for the property because he assumed that a
variance, which he anticipated, would justify his price."'"
The curative amendment procedure provides a remedy for a
landowner who is precluded from obtaining a variance because he
knew of the zoning restrictions at the time he purchased the land. As
Judge Crumlish declared in Robin Corp. v. Board of Supervisors,2
A.2d 604 (1958) (business vehicle parking permitted in residential district); Baronoff
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust., 385 Pa. 110, 122 A.2d 65 (1956) (drive-in theater permitted
in residential district).
75. 415 Pa. 285, 203 A.2d 534 (1964).
76. Id. at 291, 203 A.2d at 537.
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10912(3) (1972).
78. See Baronoff v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust., 385 Pa. 110, 122 A.2d 65 (1956);
Borough of Ingram v. Sinicrope, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 448, 303 A.2d 855 (1973);
McKay v. Board of Adjust., 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 29, 300 A.2d 810 (1973); Pfile
v. Borough of Speers, 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 226, 298 A.2d 598 (1972).
79. See Gro Appeal, 440 Pa. 552, 269 A.2d 876 (1970); Sposato v. Radnor Tp.
Bd. of Adjust., 440 Pa. 107, 270 A.2d 616 (1970); McClure Appeal, 415 Pa. 285, 203
A.2d 534 (1964); Cooper v. Board of Adjust., 412 Pa. 429, 195 A.2d 101 (1963).
80. See Bilotta v. Haverford Tp. Zoning Bd. of Adjust, 440 Pa. 105, 270 A.2d
619 (1970); Clifton Heights Appeal, 440 Pa. 101, 270 A.2d 400 (1970); Crafton
Borough Appeal, 409 Pa. 82, 185 A.2d 533 (1962); Marple Gardens, Inc. v. Zoning
Bd. of Adjust., 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 436, 303 A.2d 239 (1973); Drop v. Board of
Adjust., 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 64, 293 A.2d 144 (1972).
81. Gro Appeal, 440 Pa. 552, 560, 269 A.2d 876, 880-81 (1970); accord,
Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct., 607, 614-15, 314 A.2d
565, 569 (1974); Borough of Ingram v. Sinicrope, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 448, 453,
303 A.2d 855, 858 (1973); Pfile v. Borough of Speers, 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 226,
236-37, 298 A.2d 598, 603 (1972).
82. 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 386, 398, 332 A.2d 841, 848 (1975) (Crumlish,
J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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Where . ..the property allegedly confiscated does not suffer
from unique physical conditions or circumstances, or would not
otherwise qualify for a variance under section 912 due to the
nature of the change in zoning requested, the landowner's only
remedy is to apply for a curative amendment under sections
609.1 and 1004 of the MPC.
Sound public policy mandates that a purchaser's actual or pre-
sumed 3 knowledge of zoning restrictions at the time of purchase
should be considered irrelevant to a subsequent claim that the zoning
ordinance confiscates the property. Otherwise, free transfer of real
estate will be inhibited, real estate values depressed, and confiscatory
zoning restrictions perpetuated in the face of changing economic
conditions and development patterns.
(b) The general confiscation challenge.-Section 912(1) provides
that a variance cannot be granted when the circumstances or
conditions creating the alleged unnecessary hardship are "generally
created by the provisions of the zoning ordinance in the neighborhood
or district in which the property is located."84 This situation is appro-
priate for a curative amendment challenge alleging that all land in the
zoning district is confiscated by the ordinance.
A New Jersey case, Morris County Land Improvement Co. v.
Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills,8 5 provides an example. The
plaintiff attacked the zoning of an entire district of fifteen hundred
acres, sixty-six of which it owned. The zoning restricted the district to
passive public uses or to private uses that were economically unfeasi-
ble and to which the land was unadaptable. Specifically, swamp land
was zoned for agricultural and recreational uses. The court held the
zoning of the entire district invalid and confiscatory as a prohibition
of all reasonable uses.
General confiscatory zoning is often characterized by districts in
which the enumerated uses are passive (natural state), public, not
adaptable to the land, or not economically feasible. The motivation
typically is a desire by local officials to preserve open space without
public acquisition or to hold land for future development and thereby
retain control over the nature, timing, and location of future develop-
83. When a person purchases land, he is charged with knowledge of its zoning
restrictions. Sylvester v. Pittsburgh Zoning Bd. of Adjust., 398 Pa. 216, 220-21, 157
A.2d 175, 177 (1959).
84. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10912(1) (1972).
85. 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
ment. Both motives have been declared unconstitutional."' Discussing
the method by which local officials retain control of the timing and
location of future development, Professor Krasnowiecki made the
following point:
Faced with these limitations on their power, local officials will
naturally tend to set their zoning controls at a level which is just
below the level at which any development will be encouraged
to occur. For example, if marketable single-family homes could
be constructed economically on lots of up to three-quarters of
an acre, local officials would tend to set the controls at the one-
acre minimum or higher. This preserves the fiction of a com-
prehensive land use plan, the real plan being, of course, to deal
with each development as it comes along, through amendments,
variances, and special exceptions. Thus, in the name of gener-
ality based on an abhorrence of individualized treatment we ac-
tually permit local governments to operate a discriminatory
quota system without requiring that they state the principles
upon which it is based. Moreover, the mechanism that is avail-
able for the correction of these local decisions is so cumbersome
and confused that it positively contributes to the misuse of land
use control powers.
8 7
This discriminatory system, in which one landowner in a holding zone
gains permission for a reasonable use of his land by rezoning or
variance while another is denied permission, can be corrected by the
curative amendment procedure.
General confiscation may be quite obvious on the face of the
ordinance. In Smith v. South Centre Township Supervisorss8 the
zoning ordinance established a beautification district and limited land
uses therein to the growing of grass, flowers, and shrubbery. The
court indicated that this ordinance appeared on its face to take
property for public use without compensation.89 Alternatively, gener-
al confiscation may become apparent only after proof of the particu-
lar circumstances, which Krasnowiecki characterizes as "zoning...
just below the level at which any development will be encouraged to
occur."9 Such zoning may include large minimum lot sizes, which in
the context of market conditions and development needs and trends
prevent development, 9 land zoned for uses to which it is unadaptable
86. Preserving open space by zoning rather than by public acquisition has been
held unconstitutional. Morris County Land Improv. Co. v. Township of Parsippany-
Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963); Concord Tp. Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268
A.2d 765 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Tp. Bd. of Adjust., 419 Pa.
504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Miller v. Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951).
Holding land for future development by zoning has been held unconstitutional. Morris
County Land Improv. Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, supra; Miller v.
Beaver Falls, supra.
87. Krasnowiecki, supra note 3, at 1034.
88. 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 285, 315 A.2d 379 (1974).
89. Id. at 291, 315 A.2d at 382 (1974).
90. Krasnowiecki, supra note 3, at 1034.
91. Concord Tp. Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); National Land &
Inv. Co. v. Easttown Tp. Bd. of Adjust., 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
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because of the nature of the land, economic feasibility, or market
conditions, 2 and land zoned for public use.9 3
2. The Challenge Based on Insufficient Relation to Police Power.
-In Township of Neville v. Exxon Corp. 4 the commonwealth
court suggested that the curative amendment procedure is appropriate
to challenge zoning ordinance provisions that bear no substantial
relation to a municipality's power to protect and promote the public
health, safety, morals, and general welfare. This claim can be raised
by an exclusionary challenge, by a nonexclusionary challenge, or by
an appropriate use challenge.
(a) Exclusionary challenge.-The crux of an exclusionary chal-
lenge is that the ordinance is invalid because it either totally prohib-
its a legitimate use"5 or allocates such a small proportion of a mu-
nicipality's acreage to its development that provision for the use is
nothing more than tokenism.9 6 Robin Corp. v. Board of Supervisors9"
and Ellick v. Board of Supervisors9 acknowledged an exclusionary
challenge as properly raised by request for a curative amendment.
The leading total prohibition case of Girsh Appeal9 held a
zoning ordinance unconstitutional because it failed to provide for
apartments as permitted uses. The property in question was not
suitable for single family homes, for which it was zoned, but was well
suited for apartments. This ordinance permitted the governing body
to operate a discriminatory quota system by selectively granting vari-
ances for apartments. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared
this total exclusion of apartments unconstitutional and formulated the
standard that "[t]o be constitutionally sustained, [a municipality's]
land-use restriction must be reasonable." 00 In Beaver Gasoline Co. v.
92. Morris County Land Improv. Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40
N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963) (swamp land zoned for agriculture and recreation).
93. Id; Glorioso Appeal, 413 Pa. 194, 196 A.2d 668 (1964); Miller v. Beaver
Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951).
94. 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 225, 231, 322 A.2d 144, 147 (1974).
95. Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); Board of Sup'rs v.
Walsh, - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 341 A.2d 572 (1975).
96. In Township of Williston v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., - Pa. -, 341 A.2d
466 (1975), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a township zoning ordi-
nance, which provided for apartment construction in only eighty out of a total 11,589
acres in the township was exclusionary and unconstitutional "in that it [did] not pro-
vide for a fair share of the township acreage for apartment construction. Id. at -,
341 A.2d at 468.
97. 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 386, 394-95, 332 A.2d 841, 846 (1975).
98. 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 404, 410-11, 333 A.2d 239, 244 (1975).
99. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
100. Id. at 240, 263 A.2d at 397.
Osborne Borough10 ' the commonwealth court invalidated a zoning
ordinance that prohibited service stations. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania affirmed, emphasizing that a total prohibition challenge
is based upon a failure to serve a public purpose. The court held that
once a total ban on an apparently innocuous land use was shown, the
municipality must prove that the ban served some public purpose.
In two recent cases"0 2 landowners have employed the curative
amendment procedure to attack the validity of the zoning ordinance
of Upper Dublin Township. The landowners alleged that the ordi-
nance was unconstitutional because it failed to provide for townhouse
usage anywhere in the township. In Dublin Properties v. Board of
Commissioners'0° the lower court concluded that the township did
not exclude townhouses since, in fact, it permitted townhouse devel-
opment by way of variance. The commonwealth court rejected this
argument, reasoning that it was the total prohibition of this use in the
ordinance that was being attacked, and permitting the use by way of
variance could not cure this constitutional defect.0 4 Relying on Bea-
ver Gasoline and Girsh, the court concluded "The ordinance is un-
constitutional because it fails to provide for townhouse usage and
because the Township has not shown any relationship between the
failure to provide for such usage and the protection of the public
health, welfare and safety."'
10 5
The significance of these exclusionary challenges, from the land-
owner's standpoint, is that once he has proved that a particular use is
excluded by a municipality's ordinance, then the burden shifts to the
municipality to justify that exclusion. If the municipality fails to
justify the exclusion, then the landowner must be permitted to pro-
ceed with his development subject to such reasonable zoning regula-
tions as the lower court determines are applicable to the develop-
ment. 06
The pending ordinance doctrine is often a major element in
exclusionary challenges. A municipality faced with a challenge will
often begin work on a zoning amendment to cure the defect. Al-
though the resulting amendment may not aid the landowner, the
municipality will argue that because its zoning amendment was pend-
101. 445 Pa. 571, 285 A.2d 501 (1971).
102. Westrum Ent. v. Board of Comm'rs, - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 343
A.2d 685 (1975); Dublin Prop. v. Board of Comm'rs, - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -,
342 A.2d 821 (1975).
103. - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 342 A.2d 821 (1975).
104. Id. at -, 342 A.2d at 823.
105. Id.
106. Id. at -, 342 A.2d at 824; accord, Westrum Ent. v. Board of Comm'rs, -




ing at the time the challenge was initiated, the landowner may not
bring a total prohibition claim. In Casey v. Zoning Hearing Board"7
the zoning ordinance contained no provision for multifamily dwell-
ings in the township. After the initiation of the challenge, but before
the lower court's decision, the township enacted an amendment to
allow apartments in a section of the township, but not where the
challenging landowner's property was located. The lower court denied
the landowner any relief since the unconstitutionality of the ordinance
had been cured. The commonwealth court and the supreme court,
however, directed the building inspector to issue building permits to
the appellant. The supreme court reasoned as follows:
'Obviously, if judicial review of local zoning action is to result
in anything more than a farce, the courts must be prepared to
go beyond mere invalidation and grant definitive relief.' To for-
sake a challenger's reasonable deve!opment plans after all the
time, effort and capital invested in such a challenge is grossly
inequitable. 10
8
Unfortunately for the municipality's position, an ordinance is not
legally pending until the municipal governing body publicly advertis-
es a public meeting to consider a proposed zoning amendment. 10 9
The preparation or even the consideration of an ordinance by the
governing body does not make it pending. 1 0 A recommendation for
zoning amendment in a pending or adopted comprehensive plan is
not a pending zoning ordinance.' A comprehensive plan is separate
and distinct from the zoning ordinance and of a different nature
altogether. As explained by the commonwealth court,
The comprehensive plan does not have the legal effect of a zon-
ing ordinance, which actually regulates the land use as may be
recommended by the comprehensive plan. The planning com-
mission may recommend all kinds of desirable approaches to
land utilization and development. Not all of these may become
107. 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 473, 303 A.2d 535, a 'd with directions, - Pa.
-, 328 A.2d 464 (1974).
108. - Pa. at -, 328 A.2d at 469 [footnote omitted]. The quotation is from
Krasnowiecki, supra note 3, at 1082.
109. Cameron v. Greensburg, 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 209, 212, 281 A.2d 271,
272 (1971); accord, Gorski v. Township of Skippack, - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -,
-, 339 A.2d 624, 626 (1975); Board of Sup'rs v. Moland Dev. Co., - Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. -, -, 339 A.2d 141, 144 (1975); Northampton Tp. v. G.R.S.H.,
Inc., 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 364, 368, 322 A.2d 758, 761 (1974).
110. Lhormer v. Bowen, 410 Pa. 508, 510-11, 188 A.2d 747, 748 (1963);
Northampton Tp. v. G.R.S.H., Inc., 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 364, 368, 322 A.2d
758, 761 (1974); Borough of Monroeville v. Effie's Ups & Downs, 12 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 179, 181-84, 315 A.2d 342, 344-45 (1974).
111. Lhormer v. Bowen, 410 Pa. 508, 511, 188 A.2d 747, 748 (1963).
eventually legally enforceable in a zoning ordinance. In other
words, a comprehensive plan is abstract and recommendatory;
whereas the zoning ordinance is specific and regulatory.'
12
In Casey the supreme court properly ignored the township's reliance
on the pending ordinance doctrine because "the township had [not]
satisfied its obligation when it had not publicly advertised its intention
prior to the filing of this challenge.""' 3
When the municipality cannot avail itself of the pending ordi-
nance doctrine and the existing ordinance totally prohibits the use
sought, the landowner has a good chance of obtaining definitive relief
through the curative amendment procedure.
(b) Nonexclusionary challenge.-National Land & Investment
Co. v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment"4 contains the
rationale for nonconfiscatory and nonexclusionary curative amend-
ment challenges based upon a failure of the zoning ordinance to bear
a substantial relation to police powers of the municipality. National
executed an agreement of sale for the purchase of eighty-five acres of
land contingent upon the acceptance by Easttown Township of a
subdivision plan for the tract. At the time of the agreement the zoning
for the property required a one acre minimum area for each building
lot; a later amendment to the ordinance increased this minimum to
four acres. National sought both a variance from the minimum four
acre lot size and a building permit to construct a single family
dwelling on a one acre lot. The building permit was refused. National
then abandoned the variance request, appealed the refusal of the
building permit, and challenged the constitutionality of the zoning
ordinance as applied to all land within the district. The record con-
tained facts concerning the development trends of the area and the
zoning and development history of the township." 5 It indicated that
although the four acre minimum lot size deprived owners of part of
the value of their properties, it was not confiscatory since lots could
be sold. Against this partial deprivation of value the supreme court
112. Morelli v. Borough of St. Mary's, 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 612, 617, 275
A.2d 889, 891-92 (1971). Section 303 of the MPC provides that before the governing
body takes any action on an adopted comprehensive plan, i.e. by enacting or
amending a zoning ordinance, it must submit the proposed action to the planning
agency for its recommendation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10303 (1972). After these
procedures have been followed, the governing body may declare publicly an intent to
take action upon the ordinance by advertising that it will be considered at a particular
public meeting. The procedures for acting upon the zoning ordinance amendment
itself are set forth in §H 607-09 of the MPC. Id. H9 10607-09.
113. - Pa. at -, 328 A.2d at 467.
114. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
115. Easttown Township was located in a path of development twenty miles west
of Philadelphia; its population had grown slowly; and only five percent of its
population resided in the forty-seven percent of the township zoned for sites between
two and four acres. Id. at 519-20, 215 A.2d at 605-06.
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examined the public purposes allegedly served by the four acre mini-
mum zoning restriction. The township contended that proper sewage
disposal, protection of the water supply against pollution, road inade-
quacy, fire protection, preservation of the rural character of the area,
and maintenance of a proper setting for historic sites all justified the
four acre minimum. The court rejected these contentions and held the
ordinance unconstitutional.
The court, through Justice Roberts, formulated some guidelines
for judging the relationship between zoning and public purposes.
First, the court recognized that "[t]he point at which legitimate
public interest ceases is ... one which varies with the land involved
and the circumstances of each case.""' 6 Next, the court said,
[I]t must always be ascertained at the outset whether, in fact
it is the public welfare which is being benefited or whether, dis-
guised as legislation for the public welfare, a zoning ordinance
actually serves purely private interests.
There is no doubt that many of the residents of this area
are highly desirous of keeping it the way it is, preferring, quite
naturally, to look out upon land in its natural state rather than
on other homes. These desires, however, do not rise to the level
of public welfare. This is purely a matter of private desire
which zoning regulations may not be employed to effectuate.11 7
Concerning the preservation of open spaces and the limitation of
development, Justice Roberts stated: "If the preservation of open
spaces is the township objective, there are means by which this can be
accomplished which include authorization for 'cluster zoning' or con-
demnation of development rights with compensation paid for that
which is taken.""'  Regarding the nature of the entire dilemma, he
said:
The question posed is whether the township can stand in the way
of the natural forces which send our growing population into
hitherto undeveloped areas in search of a comfortable place to
live. We have concluded not. A zoning ordinance whose pri-
mary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order
to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the ad-
ministration of public services and facilities cannot be held
valid.
119
11.6. Id. at 524, 215 A.2d at 608.
117. Id. at 530-31, 215 A.2d at 611.
118. Id. at 529, 215 A.2d at 61l.
119. Id. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612. The dissenting opinion of Justice Cohen in
National Land objects to litigation of the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance in
the absence of development plans for the whole property. Id. at 535, 215 A.2d at 613-
14. This is now a required element of such a challenge under § 1004(2) (c) of the
MPC. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(2)(c) (1972).
The principle of National Land can be traced to the United
States Supreme Court decision of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 2 ' which held that zoning regulations must find their justification
in some aspect of the police power and that if they constitute an
unreasonable or confiscatory regulation under the guise of the police
power, they violate state and federal constitutional rights of property.
Pennsylvania precedent for the decision can be found in Medinger
Appeal. 2' In that case the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania struck
down a minimum floor area restriction as not clearly necessary for the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. The court, quoting
another Pennsylvania case with approval, said that
all property is held in subordination to the right of its reasonable
regulation by the government clearly necessary to preserve the
health, safety, or morals of the people. . . . There is one mat-
ter that is quite certain, the power to thus regulate does not ex-
tend to an arbitrary, unnecessary or unreasonable intermeddling
with the private ownership of property, even though such acts
be labeled for the preservation of health, safety and general wel-
fare. The exercise must have a substantial relation to the public
good within the spheres held proper. It must not be from an
arbitrary desire to resist the natural operation of economic laws
or for purely aesthetic considerations.
122
Similarly, in Concord Township Appeal'23 the court held a minimum
lot size unconstitutional. As in National Land, the builder in Concord
did not seek to prove the hardship necessary to secure a variance, but
instead attacked the constitutionality of the ordinance.
Recently, a landowner utilized the curative amendment proce-
dure to attack minimum lot sizes as unconstitutional. In DeCaro v.
Washington Township"4 the landowner claimed that "a minimum lot
size of three (3) acres is unconstitutional in that it bears no substan-
tial relation to the public health, safety, and welfare, and is, therefore,
an unreasonable restriction upon use or development of land." The
commonwealth court upheld the ordinance, distinguishing National
Land and Concord:
In both of those cases there was indisputable evidence that the
municipalities were refusing to accommodate their fair share of
the population growth of a large metropolitan area. It was the
exclusionary purpose and effects of the ordinance that were con-
demned by the Supreme Court in those cases. In the instant
case there is no evidence to support an argument that there is
an anticipated population growth beyond that which can be ac-
commodated under present zoning .... 125
120. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
121. 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954).
122. Id. at 222, 104 A.2d at 121.
123. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
124. No. 1477 C.D. 1974 (Pa. Commonwealth Ct., Sept. 23, 1975).
125. Id. at 5. Judge Blatt dissented, arguing that minimum restrictions of two,
three, and four acres is strongly suspected as an improper exercise of police power,
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The key in this type of challenge is proving that the restriction does
not serve the public welfare, but serves the municipality's resistence to
the infusion of new population. In DeCaro the landowner failed to
prove that this was the real purpose of the minimum lot restriction,
and, in fact, the township proved otherwise.
(c) Appropriate use challenge.-The final challenge based on
misuse of the police power is the appropriate use challenge. Krasnow-
iecki maintains that in developing the curative amendment procedure,
ft]he case which the Legislature [had] in mind . . . is a case
where the ordinance is drawn into question as applied to a par-
ticular site, based upon evidence which bears upon what the ap-
propriate use of that site should be.'
26
Zoning may eliminate uses as inappropriate from a zoning district or
even an entire municipality, if the decision is based upon rational
planning principles. But it may not eliminate uses from a municipali-
ty, a zoning district, or a site without a valid planning reason. If it
does the zoning is arbitrary and serves no cognizable public purpose
by excluding appropriate uses.' 21 In Hauser v. Borough of Catasau-
qua Zoning Hearing Board'28 the commonwealth court recognized
that a constitutional challenge to the appropriateness of zoning classi-
fications must be launched under section 1004 procedures. 2 9
In an appropriate use challenge the landowner presents evidence
to support the appropriateness of his proposed use. Appropriate use is
a broad planning question involving numerous factors: the physical
characteristics of the site; other nearby uses, such as roads, schools, or
commercial, recreational, shopping, and community facilities; local
and regional development needs and trends; new planning concepts;
and an adopted comprehensive plan or community development ob-
jectives. If the landowner can prove that his proposed use for the
particular site is appropriate within this broad context, he has estab-
lished that the applicable zoning restrictions do not bear a substantial
relation to police power purposes of preserving public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare.
and that when a landowner has demonstrated that his property is subject to such
suspect minimum lot restrictions, then the burden is on the municipality to present
constitutionally legitimate justifications for the restriction.
126. Krasnowiecki, supra note 3, at 1102.
127. See Robin Corp. v. Board of Sup'rs, 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 386, 393
n.4, 332 A.2d 841, 845-46 n.4 (1975).
128. - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, 341 A.2d 566 (1975).
129. id. at -, 341 A.2d at 571.
The plaintiff in National Land was able to establish that homes
on one acre lots were appropriate for land zoned for a four acre
minimum in the context of local and regional development needs and
trends.'30 The appropriate use factor in National Land was comple-
mented by other crucial factors: the exclusion of lower economic
groups; the failure of the zoning ordinance to serve a proper public
purpose; and confiscation, in that four acre lots were unmarketable.
Similar challenges based upon the appropriateness of a proposed use
have been rejected when raised in variance attempts,' 8 ' but now can
be properly raised by the curative amendment procedure. A curative
amendment challenge based on appropriateness of the proposed use
may be combined with allegations of exclusion and confiscation.
IV. The Elements of Proof
The landowner faces a complex task in marshaling the elements
of proof in a curative amendment challenge. First, the grounds for the
challenge may be interrelated. Secondly, the proof may require statis-
tical, historical, and socioeconomic research of the municipality and
the region. Lastly, the landowner may have to retain experts in
regional planning, urban site planning, site and soil engineering,
environmental engieering, architecture and building development,
and real estate marketing. A well-constructed curative amendment
challenge will relate a coordinated multidisciplinary analysis of the
site to the interrelated legal bases for the challenge.
A. Confiscation
Proof of confiscation involves the economic feasibility of the
permitted uses for the site and for the zoning district in the case of
general confiscation. Confiscation results when the permitted uses are
not private, profitable uses or are not economically feasible. Econom-
ic feasibility is determined by the relationship between the real estate
market and the costs of developing permitted uses.'82 The confisca-
tion of a site may be established by expert engineering testimony
about development costs of permitted uses and by expert real estate
testimony relating the costs and reasonable profit margins to marketa-
bility. Marketability involves local and regional development needs
130. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1967); see notes 107-112 and accompanying
text supra.
131. See O'Neill v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust., 434 Pa. 331, 254 A.2d 12 (1969);
Commissioners of Plymouth Tp. v. Wannop, 13 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 237, 320
A.2d 455 (1974); Philadelphia v. Earl Scheib Realty Corp., 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
11, 301 A.2d 423 (1973); Arena v. Norristown Borough Zoning Bd. of Adjust., 2 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 285, 176 A.2d 838 (1971).
132. Garbev Zoning Case, 385 Pa. 328, 122 A.2d 682 (1956).
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and trends, including recent sales, types of development, rate of
growth, and the socioeconomic makeup of the region. A qualified real
estate expert must form an opinion based on such data.
Proof of general confiscation, in addition to engineering and real
estate testimony, includes proof of complete or substantial nondevel-
opment of permitted, private uses throughout the zoning district."' 3
Discovery proceedings or an inventory of land uses within the district
may develop such proof.
B. Exclusion
Proof of exclusion of a legitimate use involves a demonstration
that the applicable zoning ordinance effectively excludes the use or
permits it only by discretionary action.' This shifts the burden to the
municipality to justify that the exclusion serves a proper public pur-
pose.'33 The challenger may present additional evidence to rebut the
evidence of the municipality. In the case of the exclusion of a housing
type, the challenger may present evidence of local and regional devel-
opment needs, trends, and market conditions. The relationship of the
socioeconomic composition of the municipality to permitted housing
types may reveal an exclusion of certain economic groups, which may
aid in the landowner's cause.1
3 6
C. Appropriate Use of the Site
A landowner may demonstrate the appropriateness of his pro-
posed use by examining the site's physical characteristics. 3 7 Site, soil,
and environmental engineers can provide an analysis of both the
proposed use and the permitted uses. They should consider the fol-
lowing factors: topography; surface and subsurface soil, rock, and
drainage conditions; preservation of natural vegetation; cost of suita-
133. See Morris County Land Improv. Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy
Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963); Glorioso Appeal, 413 Pa. 194, 196 A.2d 668
(1964).
134. See notes 95-106 and accompanying text supra.
135. See Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., - Pa. -, 328 A.2d 464 (1974); Beaver
Gas. Co. v. Osborne Borough, 445 Pa. 571, 285 A.2d 501 (1971); Girsh Appeal, 437
Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); Ellick v. Board of Sup'rs, 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975).
136. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 226 A.2d 713 (1975).
137. See Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); Zoning Bd. of
Adjust. v. Koeher, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 260, 278 A.2d 375 (1971).
ble drainage, soil erosion, and sedimentation controls; and a compari-
son of economic and environmental costs of developing permitted
uses with costs incident to the proposed use. An architect-site planner
can provide an analysis of the adaptability of the site to the proposed
and permitted uses. The analysis might include a coordinated envi-
ronmental study and comprehensive master plan relating slope, hy-
drology, geology, microclimate, physiography, and composite physi-
cal characteristics to alternative land uses. The result of the combined
efforts of the engineers and the architect-site planner will be a recom-
mended development plan most appropriate to the physical character-
istics of the site.
The landowner also may present evidence of the appropriateness
of his proposed use in the context of land use planning. 1' 8 A profes-
sional planner can analyze the proposed and permitted uses in terms
of the development objectives established by the municipality's com-
prehensive plan. The analysis might consider the extent to which the
proposed and permitted uses further these planning objectives. 39
New concepts in planned development such as planned unit develop-
ment 4 ° and planned residential development' 4 ' will aid the planner
in his analysis. Other nearby uses, as well as local and regional
development trends, also should be considered.
V. Conclusion
Prior to the MPC there was no procedure for constitutional
substantive validity challenges seeking a use prohibited by the zoning
district regulations. Courts accommodated landowners by accepting
such challenges as appeals from variance denials, an inappropriate
procedural and substantive method of raising the issues involved.
Now, section 1004 of the MPC provides a vehicle for these chal-
lenges, the curative amendment procedure. This vehicle is not a
hybrid of old procedures; rather it is a new way to resolve conflicts
between the free exercise of private property rights and the protection
138. See Robin Corp. v. Board of Sup'rs, 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 386, 332
A.2d 841 (1975); Township of Neville v. Exxon Corp., 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
225, 322 A.2d 144 (1974); Commissioners of Plymouth Tp. v. Wannop, 13 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 237, 320 A.2d 455 (1974).
139. Zoning ordinance provisions applicable to a site often predate the adoption
or amendment of a comprehensive plan or community development objectives. Section
606 of the MPC requires a statement of community development objectives in all new
and existing zoning ordinances. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 606 (1972).
140. Planned unit development is a trade name for the concept of self-contained
communities. See Village 2 at New Hope, Inc. Appeals, 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 82
(1968).
141. Planned residential development is defined in the MPC as "an area of land
• . . to be developed as a single entity for a number of dwelling units." PA. STAT.
ANN'. tit. 53, § 10107(14) (1972). Article VII authorizes municipalities to regulate
planned residential developments. id. § 10702.
Curative Amendment Procedure
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
and promotion of the public welfare. It is meant to foster cooperation,
rather than conflict and division, between landowners and local offi-
cials.
Unfortunately, the recent decisions of the Commonwealth Court
of Pennsylvania threaten the vitality of this enlightened procedure.
The court has relegated all substantive validity challenges seeking a
nonpermitted use type or intensity, with the exception of the exclu-
sionary challenge, 142 to the inadequate and improper variance proce-
dure. Variance requests to the zoning hearing board under section
912 should be limited to their originally intended role: varying the
application of zoning ordinances to permitted uses to prevent unnec-
essary hardship. True constitutional validity challenges, seeking a
nonpermited use type or intensity and based on a claim of confisca-
tion or a claim that the ordinance fails to bear a substantial relation
to the police powers of the municipality, should be processed under
section 1004. That these claims formerly were raised under the
variance procedure only points to the inadequacy of prior remedies.
Furthermore, the growth of substantive validity case law under the
pre-MPC variance procedure cannot be allowed to subvert the
changes in statutory zoning law made by the 1972 amendments in
the MPC. It is unlikely that any substantive validity case involving
confiscation and seeking a prohibited use will differ significantly
from those decided under the former variance procedure. Ignoring
the statutory changes and continuing to process these cases under
the old procedure signifies a regressive approach that hinders cor-
rective legislation and forecloses landowners' redress of infringement
of constitutionally protected rights. Fortunately, the court has rec-
ognized that exclusionary challenges, appropriate use challenges,
and challenges that the zoning fails to bear a substantial relation to
the police powers of a municipality may be raised by the curative
amendment procedure. But great concern has been expressed over
the commonwealth court's recent pronouncements in this area. It
is hoped that this article clarifies the nature and purpose of the cura-
tive amendment procedure and will prompt discussion by land use
attorneys and reconsideration by the courts.
142. Penn Tp. Bd. of Sup'rs v. DeRose, - Pa. Commonwealth Ct. -, -, 339
A.2d 859, 860 (1975).
